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Introduction
Land values have been the focus of many researchers for at least the past 250 years. The
contributors to this ﬁeld of study are documented elsewhere and need not be reiterated
here. However, most researchers agree that land markets today are basically structured as
monopolistically competitive. Agricultural land not under the inﬂuence of a nearby
urban area tends to be differentiated on the basis of soil fertility, drainage, moisture
content, etc. Undeveloped land under the inﬂuence of a nearby urban area may be in an
agricultural use, but the value of this land is often driven by factors other than soil
fertility, etc. The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the determinants of
the price of large parcels of vacant land near a growing urban area with an emphasis
upon the effects of buyer and seller characteristics, and (2) to explore the dynamics of the
plattage effect.
The importance of buyer and seller characteristics as determinants of land value is of
special interest in this study. Large parcels of undeveloped land on the edge of a growing
urban area constitute a market in which the characteristics of buyers and sellers may be
important. For example, a limited partnership may be willing to pay more for a tract of
land than an individual due to differences in tax positions and speculative interest in the
land. Also, buyer and seller characteristics may act as proxies for property characteristics
missing from the sales data set. Thus, the contribution of buyer and seller characteristics
to our understanding of urban land markets is primarily a matter to be determined
empirically. One focus of this study is to evaluate the contributions of buyer and seller
characteristics in our understanding of urban land markets.
A second argument for including buyer and seller characteristics in an hedonic price
equation is that they represent proxies for property characteristics omitted from the
equation due to incomplete information about property characteristics in the data set.
For example, a particular type of buyer, say a limited partnership, might be willing to pay
more for land with a particular characteristic, say substantial drainage and subterranean
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 1
103
Hans R. Isakson* An Empirical Analysis of 
the Determinants of the 
Value of Vacant Land
*Department of Finance, The University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa 50614-0124.
Date Revised—February 1995; Accepted—July 1995.
Abstract.  This study extends the literature that investigates the use of buyer and seller
characteristics in traditional hedonic price equation regressions. This study adds to the
existing literature on the relationship between parcel size and price, coined plattage by
Colwell and Sirmans (1980). The results reveal statistically signiﬁcant buyer and seller
effects. Also, the results conﬁrm the existence of the plattage effect and reveal a
statistically signiﬁcant change in the plattage effect over time. The ﬁndings of this study
should prove useful to those interested in the behavior of land markets on an urban fringe.support. If a particular property characteristic desired by a particular buyer is not
included in the set of property characteristics used in the hedonic regression, a variable
representing buyer characteristics could act as a proxy variable for the omitted property
characteristic.
Either way, the rationale for including buyer and seller characteristics in hedonic price
equations is justiﬁed, because doing so improves our understanding of real estate
markets. A key question, addressed by this study, is whether or not buyer and seller
characteristics add to our understanding of real estate markets. That is, are buyer and
seller characteristics signiﬁcant variables in an hedonic price equation, and if they are
signiﬁcant, does their absence bias parameter estimates, and does their presence improve
our understanding of real estate markets?
A second focus of this study is upon the phenomenon called plattage. Plattage is the
presence of a negative relationship between parcel size and price per unit area. Plattage is
reported by virtually every study that has looked for it, and it is becoming as
predominant as location in determining land values. Therefore, this study investigates
and tests for the presence of plattage. Also, this study extends previous studies of plattage
by including in the model an interaction effect between plattage and time, thereby
allowing the plattage effect to change over time.
Review of the Literature
The justiﬁcation for including buyer and seller characteristics in our understanding of
real estate markets can be supported by two distinct arguments. First and foremost,
Rosen (1974) demonstrates that an hedonic equation in property characteristics alone is
insufﬁcient for identiﬁcation of the underlying demand/supply parameters. Epple (1987)
further shows that biased parameter estimates are produced by an OLS estimation of an
hedonic equation with only property characteristics as independent variables. Bartik
(1986) and Kanemoto and Nakamura (1986) include buyer characteristics as
independent variables in hedonic equations using HUD Experimental Housing
Allowance Program and Tokyo Metropolitan High-Rise Survey data, respectively. Buyer
and seller characteristics are generally not included in hedonic equations of land prices,
primarily because the buyer and seller data are difﬁcult to obtain. Nonetheless, just
because it is difﬁcult to obtain does not justify ignoring the potential contributions this
information can make to our understanding of real estate markets.
Much of the interest in land prices in recent literature focuses upon the nonlinearity
between the price of urban land and parcel size. Recent empirical studies report that land
value increases at a decreasing rate as parcel size increases. Colwell and Sirmans (1980)
explore this phenomenon using land sales from Edinburgh, Scotland and Urbana-
Champaign, Illinois to estimate the parameters of four different models of the
relationship between size and value. Their results suggest that a standard Cobb-Douglas,
constant elasticity functional form gives the best ﬁt. In their Cobb-Douglas model, they
estimate the value-size elasticity to be .7638 in Edinburgh and .2005 in Urbana-
Champaign. Also, the Edinburgh data includes a dummy variable measuring whether the
seller is a builder, individual, or farmer. The coefﬁcient of the seller variable is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant in two of their four models.
In a similar study of land prices near Chicago, Chicoine (1981) includes data on more
property characteristics than Colwell and Sirmans, including whether the buyer and
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Chicoine’s buyer and seller variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore,
Chicoine reports a negative and signiﬁcant interaction effect between the buyer and seller
variable and commercial zoning, suggesting that his buyer and seller variable may be
acting as a proxy for an omitted variable related to commercial zoning.
Kowalski and Colwell (1986) also ﬁnd that land value increases at a decreasing rate as
parcel size increases using sales of industrial land in a single sector of western Wayne
County, a suburban area outside Detroit. Also, Kowalski and Colwell collected
information on the grantor and grantee for each transaction in order to weed out non-
arm’s-length sales (i.e., sales between related parties, etc.). However, their regressions did
not contain any variables derived from the grantor and grantee information.
None of the studies of the plattage effect allow the relationship between parcel size and
price to vary over time, primarily due to data limitations. This study uses data spanning
seven years, making it possible to test for changes in the plattage effect over time. This
extension of plattage studies has the potential of providing highly useful information to
land developers regarding market trends in the proﬁtability of the subdivision of a large
tract of land into smaller parcels.
The Data and the Model
The data consist of 363 arm’s-length land sales in the Denver, Colorado urban area from
1985 to 1992. The data were gathered from public records by a commercial data
collection ﬁrm in Denver. The arm’s-length nature of each transaction was veriﬁed by the
ﬁrm with grantors and grantees. Only arm’s-length sales of parcels of at least ﬁve acres (in
size) are included in the sample. Information on date of sale, size, zoning, grantor, and
grantees is included, along with selling price. As is the case with most real estate sales
data sets, information concerning buyer and seller characteristics is very thin. All the data
set contains regarding buyers and sellers are names. However, categorical information
can be and is extracted from this information.
A model similar to that used by Colwell and Sirmans (Model 3) and Chicoine is
adopted for use in this study. Speciﬁcally, the log of selling price is regressed upon the log
of size, the log of size times the time of the sale, and a series of variables representing
zoning, location, and the ten buyer–seller combinations. The general model is given by
the equation below:
log (SP)5a1b1 log(SZ)1b2 log(SZ)TIMEM1b3 Dist I–701dZON1hBYR / SLR ,
in which the variables are deﬁned as follows:
SP 5selling price in dollars;
SZ 5size of the parcel in acres;
TIMEM 5time of the sale in months (05Jan. 1, 1995);
Dist I–70 5distance from I–70 in miles;
ZON 5a vector of dummy variables representing zoning;
BYR/SLR 5a vector of dummy variables representing the buyer–seller
combinations.
The Greek letters represent parameters to be estimated from the data.
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(1) the size–time interaction variable given by log(SZ)TIMEM and (2) the vector of
dummy variables (BYR/SLR) representing the buyer–seller combinations. These new
variables are discussed further below.1
The Size–Time Interaction Variable
The interaction variable, log(SZ)TIMEM, adds a new dimension to the traditional
plattage model developed by Colwell and Sirmans. Speciﬁcally, this new variable allows
the relationship between parcel size and price to vary over time. If the parameter estimate
for this variable is negative, the increase in the price per acre of land due to subdivision is
increasing over time. If the parameter estimate is positive, the increase in the price per
acre of land due to subdivision is decreasing over time. Given reasonable cost
expectations, this new variable gives us an indication of the potential proﬁtability of
future subdivision.
The Buyer and Seller Variables
Previous studies have simply included variables representing particular types of buyers
and sellers in the hedonic equation. This study replicates this technique. However in this
study an additional approach is introduced. Speciﬁcally, variables representing
combinations of buyer and seller classiﬁcation are included in the analysis. The buyer and
seller combinations are worthy of exploration, for several reasons. First, buyer and seller
combinations could act as proxies for omitted property characteristics, especially if
omitted property characteristics are more likely to be correlated with a particular type of
transaction than with a particular buyer or seller; although the buyer and seller
combinations could also capture differences in the relative bargaining power or position
of the buyer and seller in the transaction. Unfortunately, we cannot predict exactly what
effect the buyer–seller combinations capture without additional information that would
probably be very costly to collect.
The ten buyer and seller combinations are derived based upon the names of the
grantors and grantees. First, the grantors and grantees are classiﬁed into one of four
types: individual, partnership, government, or corporation. Then, this classiﬁcation
scheme is used to create a new variable (BYR/SLR) that captures the ten types of buyer
and seller combinations found in the data shown in Exhibit 1. The only type of
transaction that includes government is individual grants to government. Exhibit 1 also
reports the frequency and percentage of transactions of each buyer and seller type, as well
as univariate statistics for all the data in this study.
Univariate statistics of the rest of the variables are reported in Exhibit 1. Size (SZ) is
measured in acres, time (TIMEM) is measured in months (051/1/84), location (Dist I–70)
is measured as distance (in miles) from I–70, zoning is measured by a series of dummy
variables representing commercial (C), industrial (I), planned unit development (P), and
residential (C5I5P50) zoning, and price is measured in dollars.
Hypotheses
The relationship between land value (price times size) and size is hypothesized to be
positive and nonlinear. All the transactions involve large (at least ﬁve acres) tracks of land,
basically waiting to be subdivided. Therefore, plottage, or the increase in price per acre by
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opposite of plottage, or plattage (per Colwell and Sirmans), is expected to dominate in the
data. Speciﬁcally, it is hypothesized that land value will increase with increases in size, but
the rate of this increase will be diminishing with increases in size. This hypothesis can be
tested by examination of the parameter estimate for log(SIZE) in the hedonic equation
presented earlier. Speciﬁcally, the value of this estimate is expected to lie between zero and
one.
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Exhibit 1
Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
Price 363 $859,372 $1,433,659 $10,000 $18,200,000
Size 363 107.1986 209.7083 5 2690
TimeM 363 46.8209 27.6877 13 102
















I to I 80 21.3
P to C 79 21.1
I to P 47 12.5
C to C 36 9.6
I to C 30 8.0
C to P 28 7.5
P to P 25 6.7
C to I 21 5.6
I to G 18 4.8
P to I 11 2.9
Note: The ﬁrst letter of BYR/SLR represents the type of grantor and the last letter represents the
type of grantee as follows: I5INDV, P5PART, C5CORP, G5GPVN.Expectations regarding the interaction variable (log(SIZE)TIMEM) are discussed
above. Speciﬁcally, the parameter estimate for this variable is expected to lie between plus
and minus one, but when added to the parameter estimate for log(SIZE), the sum is
expected to be less than one. Thus, this parameter should be much smaller in absolute
value than the parameter for size. Also, if this parameter estimate is negative, the increase
in the price per acre due to subdivision is increasing with time. The reverse holds if this
parameter estimate is positive.
Expectations concerning zoning are complicated by the large size of the parcels
included in this study. In general, the more densely developed the land, the higher the
price per acre. Residentially zoned land tends to be the least densely developed, and it is
hypothesized to be traded at the lowest price per acre of the four types of zoning
examined in this study. Planned unit development (P), industrial (I) and commercial (C)
lands are usually developed more densely than residential and are hypothesized to have
higher prices per acre than residentially zoned land. However, because the parcels
included in this study are so large, they will most likely be rezoned for various other land
uses when subdivided. Indeed, the trend in land development just west of the land in this
study conﬁrms this observation. When large tracts (over ﬁve acres) were subdivided, the
new parcels were usually rezoned. Therefore, the traditional effects of zoning may not be
present in the data used in this study, and hypotheses beyond those discussed earlier are
not warranted.
Because the sales are all located in the far eastern quarter of the Denver area, I–70
represents the major transportation infrastructure. Following traditional location theory,
it is expected that a premium is paid for nearness to I–70. No other major transportation
infrastructure exists in the area. Although in 1993 it was announced that the new Denver
International Airport would be built somewhere in this area, the transactions in this
study occur prior to this announcement. Thus, the major locational effect in this study is
nearness to I–70.
It is difﬁcult to establish expectations for buyer and seller characteristics, because so
little research exists in this area. As noted before, the buyer and seller characteristics may
capture the effects of demand/supply shift variables, or they may capture the effects of
some omitted property characteristic. Hypotheses based upon differences in motivations,
perhaps due to differences in tax status, are tempting to explore. But, the data are
insufﬁcient to distinguish between (1) the omitted property characteristic, and (2) shift
variable (i.e., motivational) explanations.
Results
Three versions of the model are estimated: Model 1 with no buyer and seller variables;
Model 2 with grantor and grantee dummy variables added to Model 1; and Model 3 with
the ten buyer and seller combinations dummy variables added to Model 1. Exhibits 2, 3
and 4 report the OLS results for Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Model 1 is included as a
base point for measuring the effects of the addition of the grantor/grantee variables in
Model 2 and the buyer and seller combination variables in Model 3.
Model 1 – No Buyer and Seller Variables
All of the parameter estimates in Model 1 are statistically signiﬁcant. To avoid forcing the
regression through the origin, thereby distorting the R-square value, the effect of
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is as expected, namely, positive and less than one. The parameter estimate for
log(SZ)TIMEM is negative, indicating that the increase in price per acre due to
subdivision is increasing over time. The parameter estimate for Dist I–70 is also as
expected, namely, negative. The parameter estimates for the zoning dummy variables are
all positive, with the estimate for commercial zoning being the largest, followed in order
by industrial, planned unit development, and residential. Because the effect of residential
zoning is captured by the intercept term, the parameter estimates for the three remaining
zoning dummy variables represent their deviation from residential zoning.
As observed above, it is difﬁcult to compare the parameter estimates for the zoning
variables to similar estimates in previous studies. The parcels in this study are so large
that rezoning is highly likely when the parcels are subdivided. It cannot be predicted how
the parcels in this study will be rezoned. Therefore, the zoning dummy variables may not
capture the true, ultimate land uses when the land is subdivided. Indeed, one possible
contribution of the buyer and seller data is a reﬁnement of the zoning data in this study.
Model 2 – Grantor/Grantee Variables
In Model 2, dummy variables are added representing the various types of grantors and
grantees (sellers and buyers). The OLS results for Model 2 are reported in Exhibit 3.
Again, in order to avoid forcing the regression through the origin, the intercept term
captures the effects of partnerships as grantors or grantees. The parameter estimates for
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Exhibit 2
OLS Results without Buyer/Seller Variables
(Dependent Variable: Log(Price))
Sum of Mean
Source DF Square Square F-Value Prs>F
Model 6 316.8094 52.8016 45.25 .0001
Error 356 415.3959 1.1668
Corrected Total 362 732.2053
Root LPR
R-Square C.V. MSE Mean
0.432678 8.435971 1.0802 12.8047
T for H0: Std Error
Parameter Estimate Parm.50 Pr > |T | of Estimate
INTERCEPT 11.2547 46.74 .0001 .2408
Log(Size) .7007 13.20 .0001 .0531
Log(Size)  *Time 2.0031 25.83 .0001 .0005
Dist. I–70 2.1812 26.66 .0001 .0272
Zoning C 1.3662 7.53 .0001 .1815
I .9888 4.50 .0001 .2197
P .8517 5.03 .0001 .1692the variables common to both models follow the same pattern as in Model 1. The
parameter estimates for the grantor and grantee variables are all signiﬁcant (at the .05
level) except for corporate grantees. These estimates represent deviations from
partnership grantors and grantees. Thus, transaction prices are less for individuals,
whether they are grantors or grantees, than partnerships. The reverse holds for corporate
grantors and government grantees.
Again, interpretations of these parameters cannot be made. We do not know what
effects the grantor and grantee dummy variables are capturing; although it is tempting to
interpret the higher prices paid by corporate and government grantees as a reﬁnement of
the zoning data. Unfortunately, corporate and government grantees might also be willing
to pay more for other reasons, such as tax position, greater purchasing power, etc.
Nonetheless, the fact that we cannot interpret these parameter estimates does not
diminish the fact that these data improve our understanding of land markets.
Model 3 – Buyer and Seller Combinations
In Model 3, the ten buyer and seller combination variables are added to Model 1. The
OLS results for Model 3 are reported in Exhibit 4. Again, in order to avoid forcing the
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Exhibit 3
OLS Results with Grantor and Grantee Variables
(Dependent Variable: Log(Price))
Sum of Mean
Source DF Square Square F-Value Prs>F
Model 11 396.0827 36.0075 37.6 .0001
Error 351 336.1226 .9576
Corrected Total 362 732.2053
Root LPR
R-Square C.V. MSE Mean
.5409 7.36423 .97858 12.8047
T for H0: Std Error
Parameter Estimate Parm.50 Pr > |T | of Estimate
INTERCEPT 11.6763 44.69 .0001 .2613
Log(Size) .6343 12.64 .0001 .0502
Log(Size)  *Time 2.0027 25.40 .0001 .0005
Dist. I–70 2.1479 25.83 .0001 .0254
Zoning C .8812 5.07 .0001 .1737
I .5363 2.57 .0106 .2088
P .5264 3.33 .0010 .1583
Grantor CORP .3332 2.05 .0411 .1626
INDV 2.4367 22.89 .0041 .1512
Grantee CORP .1744 1.25 .2139 .1400
GOVN .4970 2.07 .0393 .2402
INDV 2.5500 24.07 .001 .1350regression through the origin, the effect of the partnership-to-partnership type of
transaction is captured by the intercept term. All of the variables common to both
models follow similar patterns, but some have different magnitudes. The parameter
estimates for the nine BYR/SLR dummy variables represent deviations from the
partnership-to-partnership type of transaction. Five (CTOI, ITOC, ITOG, ITOP, PTOI)
of the parameter estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant, while the remaining four
(CTOC, CTOP, ITOI, PTOC) are statistically signiﬁcant. According to the pattern of
parameter estimates in Exhibit 4, higher prices are observed in partnership-to-corporation
transactions, followed closely by corporation-to-corporation and corporation-to-
partnership transactions. The partnership-to-partnership transactions (captured by the
intercept term) is next, with the lowest price observed in individual-to-individual
transactions. The results suggest that when corporations or partnerships are a party to a
transaction, that the observed price is higher, everything else held constant. Similarly,
when an individual is a party to a transaction, the observed price tends to be lower,
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Exhibit 4
OLS Results with Buyer/Seller Combinations Variables
(Dependent Variable: Log(Price))
Sum of Mean
Source DF Square Square F-Value Prs>F
Model 15 405.4714 27.0314 28.71 .0001
Error 347 326.7339 .9416
Corrected Total 362 732.2053
Root LPR
R-Square C.V. MSE Mean
.5538 7.578117 .97036 12.8047
T for H0: Std Error
Parameter Estimate Parm.50 Pr > |T | of Estimate
INTERCEPT 11.3317 39.78 .0001 .2849
Log(Size) .6495 12.92 .0001 .0503
Log(Size)  *Time 2.0027 25.57 .0001 .0005
Dist. I–70 2.1545 26.07 .0001 .0255
Zoning C .7877 4.47 .0001 .1763
I .5141 2.43 .0154 .2112
P .5172 3.27 .0012 .1584
BYR/SLR C to C .8080 3.32 .0010 .2433
C to I .1410 .52 .6050 .2724
C to P .7831 2.94 .0035 .2664
I to C 2.1123 2.44 .6598 .2549
I to G .4257 1.48 .1403 .2880
I to I 2.6466 22.91 .0038 .2218
I to P .0340 .15 .8832 .2318
P to C .9613 3.32 .0010 .2898
P to I 2.1880 2.58 .5592 .3215everything else held constant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
individuals may bargain more aggressively than corporations and partnerships because
of their different tax positions, although other explanations are possible. For example, the
ofﬁcers of a corporation grantor might also be members of a partnership grantee in 
what would appear at ﬁrst glance to be an arm’s-length transaction.2 Alternately, an
unobserved property characteristic could explain these results. Sorting out which effect
(shift variable or omitted variable) is captured by the buyer–seller information would be
interesting, but it is not critical to the basic issue of whether or not buyer and seller
characteristics matter. The fact that buyer and seller data do matter in this study as well
as in previous studies should be sufﬁcient to warrant the consideration of these data in
future studies of land prices.
Comparisons of the Three Models
In Exhibit 5, the parameter estimates, standard errors, R-square, sum of squares, degrees
of freedom, and F-tests for the three models are reported. Also, Exhibit 5 contains the
results of subtracting the parameter estimates of Model 1 from those of Models 2 and 3,
as well as F-test results of Model 1 with Model 2 and Model 1 with Model 3.
The addition of the grantor and grantee variables yields a signiﬁcantly lower sum of
square (F51.236), and the parameter estimate for Dist I–70 is lowered by a statistically
signiﬁcant amount. The addition of the ten buyer and seller combination variables
reduces the sum of squares even more than the grantor and grantee variables do, and the
parameter estimates for Dist I–70 and commercial zoning are reduced by a statistically
signiﬁcant amount. Perhaps the buyer and seller combination dummy variables are
reﬁning the location and zoning data. Model 3 with the ten buyer and seller combination
variables performs better than Model 2 with the six grantor/grantee variables. Also, the
absence of either set of buyer and seller variables produces biased parameter estimates for
at least one of the remaining variables in the model.
It is tempting to compare the sum of the parameter estimates for the separate buyer–
seller variables to the corresponding combination variables. If the only effect captured by
the buyer and seller data is, say, bargaining power, then the sum of the separate
parameters could be expected to equal the parameter for the corresponding combination
variable. On the other hand, if the buyer and seller information are capturing more than
one effect, as hypothesized above, there is no reason to expect the other effects to be
additive. Therefore, the fact that the parameters for the separate buyer and seller variables
do not add up to the corresponding parameter for the combined buyer–seller variable
implies that the buyer and seller data are indeed capturing more than one effect. But, it
does not matter how many effects the buyer and seller data captures. What is important
is that the buyer and seller information is statistically signiﬁcant and improved the
explanatory (unbiased parameter estimates on the other variables) and prediction (lower
sum of squares) power of the model.
Summary and Conclusions
This study adds to the growing documentation that buyer and seller characteristics do
matter in real estate transactions, especially in sales of urban land. Sales of large parcels
of vacant land in Denver, Colorado are examined for grantor and grantee inﬂuences after
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location, date of transaction, and zoning. The transactions are classiﬁed by grantor and
grantee type using the following categories: individual, government, corporation, and
partnership. Two versions of the grantor/grantee information are constructed: one with
two sets of dummy variables representing the type of grantor and grantee; and one with
a set of dummy variables representing ten combinations of buyer and seller type.
Some types of grantor and grantee are found to be statistically signiﬁcant, with the
highest prices paid when a governmental unit is the buyer (grantee), and the lowest prices
paid when an individual is the buyer. The use of the ten buyer–seller combinations yields
better prediction power than the separate grantor/grantee variables. Furthermore, the
highest prices paid were in partnership-to-corporation transactions, while the lowest
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Exhibit 5
Summary and Comparisons of OLS Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2–1 Model 3–1
Std Std Std
Parameter Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Diff. †-Stst Diff. †-Stst
Intercept 11.2547 .2408 11.6763 .2613 11.3317 .2849 .4216 1.1867 .0771 .2066
Log(Size) .7007 .0531 .6343 .0502 .6495 .0503 2.0664 2.9092 2.0512 2.6995
Log(Size)
*Time 2.0031 .0005 2.0027 .0005 2.0027 .0005 .0004 .5297 .0003 .4328
Dist I–70 2.0181 .0272 2.1479 .0254 2.1545 .0254 2.1298 23.487 2.1363 23.6595
Zoning: C 1.3662 .1815 .8812 .1737 .7877 .1763 2.4849 21.9306 2.5784 22.2863
I .9888 .2197 .5363 .2088 .514 .2112 2.4525 21.4929 2.4748 21.558









C to C .808 .2433
C to I .141 .0272
C to P .7831 .2664
I to C 2.1123 .2549
I to G .4257 .288
I to I 2.6466 .2218
I to P .0341 .2318
P to C .9613 .2898
P to I 2.188 .0322
R-Square .4327 .5409 .5538
Sum of Squares 425.3959 336.1226 326.7339
Df 356. 351. 347.
F-Value 45.25 37.6 28.71 1.2358 1.2714prices paid were in individual-to-individual transactions. Explanations for these ﬁndings
are not possible in this study. All we can say for sure is that in this study, as in previous
studies, buyer and seller characteristics matter.
In addition to the investigation of the effects of buyer and seller data, this study also
adds to the growing literature that focuses upon the relationship between parcel size and
price. This study conﬁrms the presence of the so-called plattage effect, and it introduces
a means of understanding the changes in this relationship over time. Speciﬁcally, by
adding an interaction effect between time-of-sale and parcel size into the standard
Cobb–Douglas model, information regarding future subdivision potential can be
extracted from the data.
Additional study is needed to conﬁrm or refute the ﬁndings of this study and to
identify other buyer and seller characteristics that might inﬂuence real estate
transactions. Unfortunately, traditional data (e.g., MLS sales) sets do not include
information regarding buyers and sellers. Data sets of housing sales with buyer and seller
characteristics, such as income, family size, occupation of head of household, age of
children, etc., should be gathered for subsequent analysis in order to better understand
the role of buyer and seller characteristics in real estate transactions. Additionally, further
investigation of the possibility of omitted variables being correlated with the buyer and
seller characteristics is warranted.
Notes
1Selectivity bias for zoning and the buyer–seller variables may be present in this model, but its effect
is assumed to be negligible.
2The author wishes to thank a referee for this explanation.
References
Bartik, T. J., Neighborhood Revitalization’s Effects on Tenants and the Beneﬁt–Cost Analysis of
Government Neighborhood Programs, Journal of Urban Economics, 1986, 234–47.
Brownstone, D. and A. De Vany, Zoning, Returns to Scale, and the Value of Undeveloped Land,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1991, 699–704.
Chicoine, D. L., Farmland Values at the Urban Fringe: An Analysis of Sale Prices, Land
Economics, 1981, 57:3, 353–62.
Colwell, P. F. and C. F. Sirmans, Nonlinear Urban Land Prices, Urban Geography, 1980, 1:2,
141–52.
Epple, D., Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply Functions for
Differentiated Products, Journal of Political Economy, 1987, 95:1, 59–80.
Kanemoto, Y. and R. Nakamura, A New Approach to the Estimation of Structural Equations in
Hedonic Models, Journal of Urban Economics, 1986, 218–33.
Kowalski, J. G. and P. F. Colwell, Market versus Assessed Values of Industrial Land, AREUEA
Journal, 1986, 14:2, 361–73.
Rosen, S., Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition,
Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82:1, 34–55.
114 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, 1997